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AUDIT REPORT LAG: DO COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FACTORS MATTER? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM LEBANESE 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
Abstract 
The objective of this study is to investigate the determinants (company specific characteristics and 
corporate governance factors) of audit report lag (ARL) in a developing country, namely, Lebanon. This 
paper adds and contributes to the limited literature that investigated the determinants of ARL in the 
developing Middle East countries through focusing on the Lebanese context. The study is carried out 
depending on a sample of Lebanese commercial banks operating in Lebanon, covering the period from 
2012 to 2017. The researchers used the multiple regression analysis to examine the impact of the 
explanatory variables on ARL. The results show a significant relationship between ARL and each of bank 
size, leverage, board independence, board diligence, audit committee (AC) independence, and AC diligence. 
The regression outcomes reveal that banks with longer ARL are smaller, have higher leverage, their boards 
and ACs are less diligence, their boards are more independent, and their ACs include less independent and 
non-executive members. 
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The usefulness of accounting data to the different users of financial reports relies on the 
timeliness of these data (Singhvi & Desai, 1971). Timeliness is one of the main qualitative features 
of financial reporting that supports the decision making of the users (IASB, 2018), delayed accounting 
data is of little use to the different investment decisions taken by the investors (Hassan, 2016). Indeed, 
among the most significant elements that influence the timeliness of information release is the 
timeliness of the external audit reports (Givoly & Palmon, 1982; Leventis et al., 2005; Afify, 2009; 
Abernathy et al., 2017). The fact that delay in performing the audit procedures and processes postpone 
the release of the audited financial reports, companies may be exposed to bad situations such as 
negative and unexpected market responses and increase in information asymmetry due to ARL 
(Abbott et al., 2012). Therefore, decreasing the external audit lag is considered essential to increase 
the timeliness of financial reporting and to promote the trust of stockholders in capital markets 
(Ettredge et al., 2006). In fact, the auditing literature has realized the significance and necessity of 
conducting researches that focus on external audit lag due to its impact on the timeliness of financial 
and audit data disclosure (Givoly & Palmon, 1982; Pizzini et al., 2015; Oussii & Taktak, 2018a). 
ARL (named also as audit delay), is measured in literature by the number of days from the end of a 
firm’s fiscal year till the date of signing the audit report, which is the time needed to finish the audit 
mission (Ashton et al., 1987; Hussin & Bamahros, 2013; Pazzini et al., 2015; Hassan, 2016; Oussii 
& Taktak, 2018a).  
Timely financial reporting in developing markets is so critical, because data in those markets 
are finite and take long time to be published (Afify, 2009). Since timely financial data can support 
decision-makers and decrease information asymmetry in those capital markets, scouting the 
determinants of ARL in Lebanon, which is one of the developing markets, is essential. The goal of 
this study is to examine whether the company specific characteristics (company size, financial 
performance and financial condition) and corporate governance factors (Frequency of board 
meetings, board size, board independence, AC size, AC independence, and frequency of AC 
meetings) influence ARL. This paper contributes to the limited literature that investigated the 
determinants of ARL in the developing Middle East countries. Especially that this finite literature 
reveals contradict results regarding the direction and significance effect of each of these determinants 
on ARL. This can be due to the variations in each of the regulatory and institutional situations, 
measures of explanatory and dependent variables, and the number of years and observations that each 
study covers. In this concern, Durand (2019) found in her meta-analysis study of the determinants of 
ARL that the relationships between each of corporate governance factors (concerning the boards and 
their ACs) and ARL are still unobvious; thus, the author suggested further research to be conducted 
to clarify and explain these associations. Due to this inconsistency in literature findings, the 
researchers consider that investigating the associations between ARL and each of the company 
characteristics and corporate governance elements in the Lebanese context may provide additional 
clarification and explanation for these associations. The study is conducted on 130 annual reports 
related to 24 Lebanese commercial banks operating in Lebanon, covering the years from 2012 to 
2017. The results reveal that the ARL for the sample banks ranges from 51 to 273 days, with an 
average 122 days, for the six-year period (2012-2017). Regarding the company specific factors, the 
multiple regression analysis reflects that both bank size and leverage have significant influence on 
ARL but in opposite directions, the bank size affects ARL negatively but leverage influences the audit 
lag positively. Concerning the third company characteristic, it is found that bank’s profitability has 
insignificant impact on audit delay. In addition, the outcomes show that three corporate governance 
factors (frequency of board meetings, AC independence, and frequency of AC meetings) have 
negative significant influence on ARL; however, one corporate governance factor (board 
independence) affects audit delay positively and significantly. Regarding the control variable, the 
findings document that ownership concentration has positive significant influence on external audit 
delay. 
The rest of this study is arranged as follows: The second section presents brief background 
about timeliness of financial reporting and ARL in USA, Europe, and Lebanon; besides, this section 
displays a set of Lebanese laws and circulars issued for boosting the corporate governance 
mechanisms in the banking sector. The third section presents the literature review and develops the 
study’s hypotheses. The fourth section displays the research methodology, while the fifth section 
 
demonstrates the regression analysis results. Finally, the sixth section illustrates the conclusion of the 
study, comprising the limitations and suggestions for further future research.  
 
2. BACKGROUND 
The audit washout in the early periods of 2000s increased the doubt in the quality and timeliness 
of financial data, which resulted in the issuance of the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) act 2002 in USA 
(Ettredge et al., 2006; Eulerich et al., 2017). Sections 404 and 409 of SOX act (2002) recommend 
external auditors to accomplish more efforts in less time (Ettredge et al., 2006; Bronson et al., 2011; 
Pizzini et al., 2015). After the publishing of section 409, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) gradually shortened the deadlines for submitting the 10- K reports, which comprise the audited 
financial statements and the external audit report, of the accelerated filers 30 days (from 90 to 60 
days) covering a three-year period. The goal of this action was to increase the timeliness of financial 
data (Pizzini et al., 2015). Similarly, in Europe there was an increasing interest in improving the 
timeliness of data dissemination. In this concern, the European Union mentioned: “The disclosure of 
accurate, comprehensive and timely information about security issuers builds sustained investor 
confidence and allows an informed assessment of their business performance and assets. This 
enhances both investor protection and market efficiency” (EU, 2004, Para. 1). 
Consistent with the international callings to achieve more timely financial data through 
accelerating the release of the external audit report and the audited financial statements, the Lebanese 
central bank (Banque du Liban) since 1982 was interested in enhancing the timeliness of financial 
statements of the banking sector. The Basic Circular No 7 published by the Lebanese central bank in 
1982 requires from the banks operating in Lebanon to submit their external audit reports before 
September 30 of each year (BDL, 1982). Moreover, the Basic Circular No 122 and the Intermediate 
Circular No 447, published by the central bank, recommend the external auditors of these banks to 
follow the International Standards on Auditing (ISA), comprising ISA 700-701-705-706-720, while 
accomplishing their audit and preparing the audit reports (BDL, 2009; BDL, 2017).  
The Lebanese central bank focuses also on promoting the corporate governance mechanisms 
in the banking sector through issuing several circulars. For example, the Basic Circular No 106 (BDL, 
2006) and the Intermediate Circular No 255 (BDL, 2011a) require from the banks functioning in 
Lebanon to follow the rules released by the International Basel Committee and to formulate their own 
“Corporate Governance Guide” that should state the procedures that must be followed by the banks’ 
departments to execute the rules of corporate governance. The guide of each bank should also specify 
the board’s responsibility, size and synthesis (number of non-executive, independent, and executive 
directors). Furthermore, these two circulars recommend the bank’s internal audit function to check 
whether all the departments follow the corporate governance regulations and principles (BDL, 2006; 
BDL, 2011a). In this concern and for the purpose of enhancing the efficacy and efficiency of the 
banks’ boards, the Basic Circular No 118 and the Intermediate Circular No 253 recommend the 
Lebanese banks to elect boards that include sufficient number of nonexecutive and independent 
directors and to establish ACs independent from management with minimum size of three members. 
Those two circulars also require from the banks’ boards and ACs to conduct frequent and periodic 
meetings during the year in order to discuss the different regular and urgent cases (BDL, 2008; BDL, 
2011b). 
The Lebanese banking sector was one of the distinguished banking sectors worldwide due to 
its high liquidity and cohesive solvency; besides, it was protected against the several local and foreign 
jolts. The stability of the Lebanese banks in the various global economic jolts made the sector gain 
wide reputation during the global financial crisis in 2008 (Alrub et al., 2018). 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The literature revealed several company specific characteristics and corporate governance 
factors that may influence ARL. The most company characteristics that were addressed in research 
(for instance, Owusu-Ansah & Leventis, 2006; Pizzini et al., 2015; Hassan, 2016; Abernathy et al., 
2017; Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018; Durand, 2019) as determinants of ARL are company size, industry, 
and company’s financial performance and financial condition (proxied by profitability and leverage). 
Besides, the most corporate governance factors that were addressed in prior studies (for example, 
Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Samaha & Khlif, 2017; Oussii & Taktak, 2018b; Baatwah et al., 2019; Habib 
 
et al., 2019) as determinants of ARL are board characteristics (board’s size, independence, and 
diligence) and AC characteristics (AC’s size, independence, and diligence). 
 
3.1 Company Specific Determinants 
The company specific determinants of ARL that this study focuses on are company size 
and the two proxies of financial performance and condition (profitability and leverage). The 
current study emphasizes on these characteristics because, as stated before, they were addressed 
in literature (for example, Abernathy et al., 2017; Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018; Durand, 2019) as the 
most common determinants of ARL that are related to company characteristics. The next context 
illustrates those determinants as documented in literature. 
 
3.1.1 Company size 
The studies that examined the association between the size of the company and 
ARL (e.g. Davies & Whittred, 1980; Ashton et al., 1987, Owusu-Ansah & Leventis, 2006; 
Abbott et al., 2012; Pizzini et al., 2015; Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018; Oussii & Taktak, 2018a; 
Durand, 2019) provided evidence that the two variables are significantly related. However, 
there is no agreement in literature concerning the direction of this association. 
Although Pizzini et al. (2015) and Oussii and Taktak (2018a) found that ARL is 
positively associated with the company size, the majority of empirical research (e.g. 
Ashton et al., 1987; Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991; Ettredge et al., 2006; Afify, 2009; Al-
Ghanem & Hegazy, 2011; Abbott et al., 2012; Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018; Durand, 2019) 
argued that there is a negative association between the two factors. According to the 
second point of view, larger firms are able to finish auditing their financial statements 
earlier than smaller firms for various reasons. First, big firms are more capable to possess 
stronger internal control system, which would diminish the likelihood of having errors in 
the financial reports and encourages the external auditor to rely more on those controls; 
hence, the ARL would decrease (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991; Abbott et al., 2012). Second, 
large companies are more probable to have sufficient resources ready to be used for paying 
high audit fees to accelerate the issuance of the audit opinion (Afify, 2009). Third, since 
large firms are more monitored by regulatory agencies, trade unions, and investors, they 
face high external pressure to shorten the time of issuing the annual financial reports 
(Davies & Whittred, 1980). Finally, big companies are more likely to possess modern 
accounting softwares and have formal policies and procedures that would lead to timely 
audit completion (Afify, 2009). Based on the arguments of these studies, the first research 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H 1: There is a negative relationship between company size and ARL. 
 
3.1.2 Financial performance and financial condition 
Profitability had been examined in literature as a determinant of ARL that reflects the 
performance of the company. Net income was used in some of these studies (for example, 
Courtis, 1976; Durand, 2019) as indicator of performance; while, return on assets (ROA) was 
used in other papers (e.g. Pizzini et al., 2015; Samaha & Khlif, 2017; Oussii & Taktak, 2018a 
& b) as a proxy for performance that reflects the company’s profitability strength. Those studies 
consistently argued that profitability is negatively associated with ARL and found that bad 
performers publish less timely financial reports. Firms with high profitability are more probable 
to finish auditing their statements earlier in order to faster the publishing of their audited annual 
reports and transmit the “good news” to the stakeholders (Carslaw & Kaplan; 1991; Khoufi & 
Khoufi, 2018). Moreover, companies that report income less than anticipated may devote extra 
time to verify the reported outcomes or look for unregistered income items, which would delay 
the issuance of the audit report (Afify, 2009). Building on these arguments the researchers 
hypothesized that:  
 
H 2a: There is a negative relationship between profitability and ARL. 
 
 
Leverage is another proxy for performance and financial condition that was addressed 
in the studies that examined the external audit lag (for example, Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991; 
Bamber et al., 1993; Pizzini et al., 2015; Samaha & Khlif, 2017; Durand, 2019). These papers 
argued that external auditors might be more cautious when auditing firms with high debts, 
which would increase the ARL. Companies with high leverage may face additional financial 
problems that may push their managers to manipulate the accounting numbers and release to 
stockholders optimistic information. In this case, the external auditor would increase the audit 
efforts to decrease the additional audit risk generated from the poor financial condition, which 
in turn would increase the ARL (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991; Samaha & Khlif, 2017). Based on 
these interpretations the researchers hypothesized that: 
 
          H 2b: There is a positive relationship between leverage and ARL. 
 
3.2 Corporate Governance Determinants 
In addition to the company specific characteristics, the literature (for example, Wu et al., 
2008; Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2016) mentioned several elements of corporate 
governance that may have impact on ARL. The sturdiness of the corporate governance 
mechanisms of the company can influence the external auditors’ control risk assessment and the 
extent of their audit tests, which would influence ARL (Durand, 2019). The two groups of 
corporate governance factors that this study focuses on are board characteristics and AC 
characteristics. The current study emphasizes on those two groups because, as mentioned before, 
they were addressed in literature as the most common determinants of ARL that are related to 
corporate governance factors. Thus, the following context illustrates the influence of these 
characteristics on ARL according to the previous studies.  
 
3.2.1 Board characteristics 
The ability of the board to reduce ARL depends on its attributes, which are size, 
independence, and diligence (indicated by the recurrence of board meetings).  
 
3.2.1.1 Board size 
From a long time, a continuous debate among accounting and auditing 
researchers had occurred regarding whether small or large boards are more 
efficacious in oversighting and monitoring the managers and in enhancing the 
quality and timeliness of financial statements. On one hand, it was claimed that 
large boards are more efficacious in performing their tasks due to the multilateral 
experience that their members may possess and are more able to decrease the 
dominance of management (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). In addition, large boards with 
diversity of members may have more desire to publish timely corporate information 
on the firm’s website to entice new stockholders and satisfy the needs of different 
stakeholders (Ezat & El-Masry, 2008). On the other hand, according to the agency 
theory there should be a supreme limit to the number of directors to have an 
effective board (Hassan, 2016). Consistent with the argument of this theory, Jensen 
(1993) reported that if the board size is more than eight members, then the board 
would be ineffective in performing his duties. The large board may impede the 
ability to exchange ideas and reach an agreement among the members in the various 
decisions (Dalton et al., 1999; Mak & Li, 2001; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). 
Furthermore, large boards may create problems in coordination and 
communication, thus their monitoring efficiency and effectiveness would decline 
(Wu et al., 2008; Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 2010). Since timely release of annual 
reports requires effective monitoring and more coordination between the board 
members, large boards may increase the lag of publishing the annual reports (Wu 
et al., 2008). 
Due to these arguments, there are opposite points of view in literature 
concerning the relationship between board size and ARL. Although Samaha and 
Khlif (2017) posited that board size affects ARL negatively, Hassan (2016) and 
Habib et al. (2019) suggested the opposite. However, Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010) 
 
hypothesized significant association between the two variables without specifying 
the sign of this association. The authors of these studies supported their suggestions 
through referring to prior literature. For instance, Habib et al. (2019) debated that a 
large board is usually less efficacious in monitoring the various managerial tasks, 
including the tasks associated with financial reporting; besides it impedes the ability 
of its members to coordinate and communicate with each other, which would 
increase the ARL. In contrast, Samaha and Khlif (2017) argued that a large board 
may decrease ARL because it is more probable to include the required expertise. 
These contradicting results impede the researchers’ ability to expect the sign of the 
relationship between board size and ARL; thus, the researchers hypothesized that:  
 
                             H 3a: There is a significant relationship between board size and ARL. 
 
3.2.1.2 Board independence 
Board independence stands for the proportion of insiders versus outsiders. 
The presence of independent members in the board may have a vital influence on 
the monitoring role of the board to decline the likelihood of managers’ opportunistic 
attitude (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and to support the financial reporting process 
(Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). Consequently, if the governance structure of a firm 
implements effective monitoring procedures and follows a vigorous strategic 
perspective, there is high likelihood to achieve both more efficient (fewer tests of 
details) and effective external audit (Cohen et al., 2002). The literature (for 
example, Afify, 2009; Chan et al., 2016; Samaha & Khlif, 2017) suggested a 
negative relationship between the independence of the board and audit delay. In this 
concern, Gilson (1990) documented that an independent board may require high 
audit quality to secure its reputation, and since timely audit reporting is an indicator 
of high audit quality (Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018), the independent board is more likely 
to require timely audit reports. Consistently, Chan et al. (2016) documented that the 
independency of the board enhances its oversight duty and assures more timely 
publishing of the audited financial statements and audit report. Based on these 
arguments the researchers hypothesized that: 
 
                            H 3b: There is a negative relationship between board independence and ARL. 
 
3.2.1.3 Board diligence 
Diligence is another board characteristic that was examined in literature as a 
determinant of ARL, proxied by the recurrence of board meetings. The frequent 
board meetings improve the performance of the members and enable them to 
accomplish their tasks properly (Conger et al., 1998), which would enhance the 
internal control system of the firm. In this case, the strong internal control system 
would encourage the external auditor to increase his reliance on the client’s internal 
controls to reduce his work; thus, the ARL would decline (Hashim & Abdul 
Rahman, 2010). In this concern, Tauringana et al. (2008) revealed that the 
recurrence of board meetings has positive and significant impact on the timeliness 
of the annual reports. In the same vein, Hashim and Abdul Rahman (2010) showed 
that firms that hold frequent board meetings had more effective corporate 
governance mechanism, which was reflected by increase in their performance and 
earlier publishing of their external audit reports. Consistently, Chan et al. (2016) 
and Habib et al. (2019) reported that boards that conduct more frequent meetings 
have better overseeing of the financial reporting process and are more interested in 
achieving timely disclosure of financial reports, which would decrease the ARL. 
Building on these arguments the researchers formulated the following hypothesis: 
 




3.2.2 Audit committee characteristics 
The literature revealed that ACs can have a vital role in reducing audit lag (e.g. 
Afify, 2009; Hashim & Abdul Rahman, 2010; Pizzini et al., 2015; Hassan, 2016; Baatwah 
et al., 2019). However, the effectiveness of the ACs in accomplishing this role depends on 
their features, such as size, independence, and diligence. 
 
3.2.2.1 Audit committee size 
The AC cannot perform its duties effectively unless it includes a sufficient 
number of members (DeZoort et al., 2002; Davidson et al., 2005). Since 
publishing more timely financial reports is one of the duties of the ACs, it is 
expected that larger ACs decrease ARL. The different points of view in a large 
AC would lead to better assessment of the work accomplished by the external 
auditors (DeZoort et al., 2002). Furthermore, the variety of skills that the large AC 
may possess would increase its ability to solve conflicts related to the audit report 
(DeZoort et al., 2003). In this concern, some studies (for instance, Mohamad-Nor 
et al., 2010; Nelson & Shukeri, 2011; Durand, 2019) found that firms with larger 
ACs have shorter ARL. Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010) documented that larger ACs 
are more probable to spend additional time and exert more effort to release timely 
financial reports to the users. Relatedly, Nelson and Shukeri (2011) argued that a 
larger AC has more willingness to increase the strength of the company’s internal 
control system, which would affect positivity the auditor’s evaluation of the 
company’s business and audit risk and decrease the audit procedures and 
substantive tests accomplished by the external auditor; thus the ARL would 
decline. Based on these arguments the study hypothesized that: 
 
                               H 4a: There is a negative relationship between AC size and ARL. 
 
3.2.2.2 Audit committee independence 
Independence is another proxy for AC effectiveness. If the members of the 
AC are not independent from managers, they cannot accomplish their tasks well 
(Davidson et al., 2005; Oussii & Taktak, 2018b). The Blue Ribbon Committee 
Report (1999) documented that ACs should only consist of non-executive or 
independent members, or else they would not be able to act effectively. The 
presence of independent AC increases the likelihood to achieve financial 
statements with high quality (Davidson et al., 2005) and decrease the probability 
of having a qualified audit opinion (Pucheta-Martinez & De Fuentes, 2007). In 
this concern, Krishnan (2005) found that the likelihood to have problems in the 
internal controls over financial reporting is less in the existence of independent 
AC; in this case, the external auditor would decrease the planned audit hours and 
perform less audit procedures. Relatedly, both Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010) and 
Oussii and Taktak (2018b) posited that AC independence and audit lag are 
negatively related. Based on these arguments the researchers formulated the 
following hypothesis: 
 
                               H 4b: There is a negative relationship between AC independence and ARL. 
 
3.2.2.3 Audit committee diligence 
The effectiveness of the AC is influenced by the number of meetings it 
holds per year (Davidson et al., 2005). During the AC meetings, the problems 
related to financial reporting process may be discovered. However, if the number 
of the meetings is not sufficient, the troubles could not be detected and might not 
be solved in a short time, which in turn, would reduce the quality of corporate 
reporting (Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010). In this concern, Abbott et al. (2003) argued 
that by conducting frequent meetings, the AC would be regularly informed about 
the various accounting and auditing matters and would be more able to drive the 
external audit resources to achieve more timely financial disclosure. In the same 
 
vein, Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010) reported that the more the AC conducts frequent 
meetings, the more likelihood it can resolve financial problems and lead the 
external auditor to prepare timely audit report. Consistently, Samaha and Khlif 
(2017) found that AC activity, reflected by the frequent meetings, improves the 
quality of corporate reporting through decreasing ARL and enhancing the 
timeliness of corporate disclosure. Building on these arguments the researchers 
hypothesized that: 
 
H 4c: There is a negative relationship between the frequency of AC meetings and 
ARL. 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In order to test the validity of this research’s hypotheses, an empirical study is conducted 
depending on the data collected from the annual reports of the Lebanese commercial banks, covering 
the period from 2012-2017. This section is devoted for presenting the population and sample of the 
study, the method of collecting data, the formulated research model, and finally the measurement of 
the various variables of the research model. 
4.1 Population and Sample 
This study focuses on the Lebanese banking sector because it was the most flourishing 
sector in Lebanon, especially the commercial banks (Alrub et al., 2018). In Lebanon, there are 
62 active banks, including 8 Arab and foreign banks and 54 Lebanese banks. The 54 Lebanese 
banks are composed of 19 noncommercial and subsidiaries of commercial banks and 35 
commercial banks (BDL, 2019). The population of this study is the 35 Lebanese commercial 
banks operating in Lebanon. From these 35 banks,  
11 banks are removed from the sample because either they do not publish their annual 
reports or publish reports with missing data and those data are not found in their websites, thus 
the final sample is 24 commercial banks. Some of these 24 banks did not publish the annual 
report for certain years, which led to decrease the number of total observations from 144 (24 x 
6) to 130 bank-year observations over the period 2012-2017. Table 1 displays the basis for 
selecting the final sample and the number of observations. 
 
4.2 Data Collection 
The main source of data that this study depends on is the annual reports of 24 Lebanese 
commercial banks operating in Lebanon, over the period 2012-2017. In addition, the researchers 
used the websites of some of these banks to get any missing information in the annual reports. 
The researchers intend to cover a long term interval period to provide more valid results. The 
study considers the six years, from 2012 till 2017, because they are the most recent years that 
the researchers could collect data about. Up to the date of preparing this research, the last annual 
reports presented in the websites of the sample banks are related to the year 2017.  
 
 
Table 1:The Final Sample Selection Criteria and the Number of Observations 
 Total Number 
Lebanese Commercial Banks            35 
(-) Banks that do not publish the annual reports or publish reports with missing data           (11) 
Final Sample            24 
Total expected annual reports for the period (2012-2017) (24 x6)           144 
(-) Missing annual reports for certain years.           (14) 
Final number of bank-year observations           130 




4.3 Research Model and Measurement of Variables 
The model of the current study is presented in Fig. 1. The researchers proposed this model 
to examine the effect of the company specific characteristics (company size, profitability, and 
leverage) and corporate governance factors (board characteristics and AC characteristics) on 
ARL.  
A multiple regression analysis is conducted to test the hypotheses of this study and to 
investigate the individual impact of each of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable. 
The regression equation is formulated as: 
 
ARL =α+β1 SIZE +β2 PROF +β3 LEV +β4 BSIZE +β5 BIND +β6 BMEET + β7 ASIZE + β8 
AIND+Β9 AMEET+ β10 OWNC +ε  
 
The researchers find that it is necessary to control for the ownership concentration 
(OWNC). Hassan (2016) and Khoufi and Khoufi (2018) argued that companies with high 
ownership concentration have longer ARL. In ownership concentration companies, opposite to 
ownership dispersion, where small major investors own big percentages of stocks, the likelihood 
to publish faster audited financial statements is low (Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018). Regarding the 
measurement of variables, Table 2 displays the definition of the model variables and their 





                  
Fig.1: Proposed Research Model 






5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section displays the evolution of ARL of the study sample during the six-year period (2012 
– 2017), descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables, correlation, multivariate 
analysis, and sensitivity analysis. 
 
5.1 Evolution of the Audit Report Lag 
The average ARL evolution of the sample banks over the six- year period (2012-2017) is 
presented in Table 3 and Fig. 2. The figure shows significant increase in the average ARL for 
the Lebanese commercial banks in 2016 and 2017, as compared to the previous years. Indeed, 
the average ARL increased from 116 days (in 2015) to 137 days (in 2016). Although this increase 
is considered a negative signal for stockholders because it decreases the quality of audit reports 
(Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018), the averages of 2016 and 2017 are still within the acceptable period 
for submitting the audit reports to the Lebanese central bank. As mentioned in Basic Circular No 
7 published by the central bank, the Lebanese banks should submit their external audit reports 





Table 3: Average ARL in Days 
  Table 2: Measurement of Variables  
 













 Audit Report Lag 
(ARL) 
Measured by the number of days from 
the end of a bank’s fiscal year to the 
date of signing the external audit report. 
(Ashton et al., 1987; Hussin & Bamahros, 
2013; Pazzini et al., 2015; Hassan, 2016; 





































Company Size             
(SIZE) 
Measured by the natural logarithm of a 
bank’s total assets. 
(Ettredge et al., 2006; Afify, 2009; Abbott 
et al., 2012; Pizzini et al., 2015; Khoufi & 




Measured by a bank’s ROA (net 
income divided by the total assets) 
(Pizzini et al., 2015; Samaha & Khlif, 
2017; Oussii & Taktak, 2018a &b). 
leverage (LEV) Measured by a bank’s total debts to 
total assets. 
(Ettredge et al., 2006; Abbott et al., 2012; 
Dao & Pham, 2014; Pizzini et al., 2015; 







































Board size             
(BSIZE) 
Measured by the number of board 
members. 
(Ezat & El-Masry, 2008;Wu et al., 2008; 
Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010; Hassan, 2016; 




Measured by a proportion of 
nonexecutive directors to total number 
of members in the board. 
(Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Akhtaruddin et 
al., 2009;  Nelson & Shukeri, 2011) 
Board Meetings 
(BMEET) 
Measured by the number of board 
meetings in a year  
(Chan et al., 2016; Habib et al., 2019). 
AC Size                  
(ASIZE) 
Measured by the number of AC 
members.    
(Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010; Nelson & 
Shukeri, 2011; Oussii & Taktak, 2018b; 
Baatwah et al., 2019). 
AC 
Independence                  
(AIND) 
Measured as a proportion of 
independent and/or non-executive 
directors to the total number of 
directors included in the AC.  
(Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010; Oussii & 
Taktak, 2018b)  
AC Meetings                 
(AMEET) 
Measured by the number of meetings 
held by the AC during the year. 
(Oussii & Taktak, 2018b; Habib et al., 
















Measured by the percentage of capital 
held by major shareholders. The major 
shareholders are those who own more 
than 5 % of the bank’s shares. 
(Hassan, 2016; Oussii & Taktak, 2018b; 
Baatwah et al., 2019) 
Source: Developed by the Researchers  
 
 
Years 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Audit Delay 115.6 110 110.7 115.8 136.8 135.9 
Source: Developed by the Researchers 
    
 
 
                   
Fig.2: Evolution of Average ARL in 2012-2017  
Source: Developed by the Researchers 
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the model’s variables are summarized in Table 4. It is evident 
in the table that the average audit delay for the 130 bank-year observations over the six-year 
period (2012-2017) is 121.6 days (standard deviation 35.299) with minimum and maximum 
intervals of 51 and 273 days, respectively. Thus, the Lebanese commercial banks take in average 
4 months and 3 days to be ready to publish the audited financial reports to the stakeholders. The 
results reveal high variations of audit delay among the sample banks; however, all banks meet 
the deadline for submitting the external audit report to the Lebanese central bank (within 273 
days from the end of the bank’s year). Compared with the ARL in developing and developed 
countries, the average ARL for the Lebanese commercial banks seems to be higher than the audit 
lag of the listed firms in these countries. For instance, in the developing countries, Afify (2009) 
reported an average ARL of 67.21 days for the Egyptian listed companies in the year 2007. 
Consistently, Hassan (2016) documented an average audit lag of 62.04 days of the Palestinian 
listed firms for the year 2011. In the developed countries, Khoufi and Khoufi (2018) found that 
the average ARL for a sample of 50 French firms is 88 days over the period 2010-2014, within 
an interval of 29 and 180 days. A probable interpretation for the difference between the mean 
ARL of this study and other studies carried out in various developed and developing countries is 
that this study concentrates only on the banking sector; however, the other studies were 
conducted on more than one sector. For example, Afify (2009) carried out his study on a sample 
of 85 Egyptian organizations from various sectors and listed in the Egyptian stock exchanges. 
Khoufi and Khoufi (2018) conducted their research on a sample of 50 firms listed in Paris stock 
exchange market and related to different sectors, except the banking sector. The authors 
considered that the operations of the financial sector are much different from other sectors; thus, 
it should be excluded from the sample. 
Table 4 also provides information concerning the explanatory variables. Regarding the 
board characteristics, the board size ranges from 7 to 13 board members, with a mean of 10 
members. The mean number of meetings conducted by the banks’ boards is 5 meetings per year 
and in average 68.86% of the boards’ members are non-executive. Concerning the AC 
characteristics, the mean number of AC members of the sample banks is approximately 4, with 
minimum and maximum intervals of 3 and 5 members, respectively. The mean (0.932) of the 
AC independence reflects that the majority members of the ACs are independent and/or non-
executive members. Moreover, in average the ACs conducted 4 meetings per year during the 
period (2012-2017). With respect to the company specific determinants, the natural logarithm of 



















while ROA ranges from -1.56 to 1.99. The mean (0.9055) of the leverage reflects that total debts 
represents high proportion of the sample banks’ total assets. Concerning the control variable, 
ownership concentration, the proportion of stocks owned by the major stockholders ranges from 
41.04 % to 99.99%; and the standard deviation of (19.296) indicates high variations among the 
sample banks regarding ownership concentration.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Dependent Variable      
ARL (Days) 130 51.00 273.00 121.5923 35.29954 
Independent Variables      
SIZE 130 12.86 18.02 15.8755 1.20547 
PROF (ROA) 130 -1.56 1.99 .8585 .36779 
LEV 130 .79 .94 .9055 .02953 
BSIZE 130 7.00 13.00 9.9154 1.61406 
BIND 130 .36 1.00 .6886 .14822 
BMEET 130 4.00 12.00 5.3538 2.07929 
ASIZE 130 3.00 5.00 3.5769 .66897 
AIND 130 .67 1.00 .9321 .11774 
AMEET 130 3.00 8.00 4.2308 .84025 
Control Variable      
OWNC 130 41.04 99.99 80.3171 19.29648 
Note: ARL, audit report lag; SIZE, bank size; PROF, profitability; LEV, leverage; BSIZE, board size; BIND, board 
independence; BMEET, board meetings; ASIZE, AC Size; AIND, AC independence; AMEET, AC meetings; OwnC, 




As revealed in Table 5, there are significant correlations between ARL and each of the 
explanatory variables at 0.01 or 0.05 significant levels, except for AC size.  The correlation 
coefficient value (0.526) between bank size and board size is the highest among the correlation 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. Thus, there is no multicollinearity problem since all the 
correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables are less than 0.8 (Bryman & Cramer, 
2011). Furthermore, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all the explanatory variables, shown 
in Table 6, are below 4; which provides additional evidence that there is no severe 
multicollinearity trouble among the explanatory variables (Kutner et al., 2004). Moreover, the 
Durbin-Watson (DW) value (2.024) shown in Table 6 reflects that there is no serious 
autocorrelation problem (Durbin & Watson, 1950). 
 
Table 5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Model Variables 
 
 ARL SIZE PROF LEV BSIZE BIND BMEET ASIZE AIND AMEET OWNC 
ARL  1           
SIZE  -.303** 1          
PROF  -.233** .389** 1         
LEV  .178* .300** .044 1        
BSIZE  -.266** .526** .154 .032 1       
BIND  .185* -.037 -.052 -.203* -.087 1      
BMEET  -.252** .038 .027 -.015 -.028 -.020 1     
ASIZE  -.054 .079 .182* -.061 .383** .037 -.031 1    
AIND  -.244** .244** .125 .183* .157 .101 .154 -.227** 1   
AMEET  -.488** .215* .214* -.196* .112 -.049 .272** -.197* .283** 1  
OWNC  .254** -.393** -.155 -.091 -.313** .025 -.007 -.095 .093 -.214* 1 







5.4 Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 6 displays the outcomes of the multiple regression analysis. The adjusted R2 reflects 
that the explanatory variables are accounting for 36.7 % of the variance in ARL. The F- value of 
8.49 (P = 0.000, less than 0.05) supports the significance of the regression model. The outcomes 
show that three variables (leverage, AC meetings, board independence), one variable (AC 
independence), and three variables (bank size, board meetings, ownership concentration) are 
statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively in interpreting ARL of the Lebanese 
commercial banks. The p-value (0.17) of AC size reflects insignificant relationship between the 
variable and ARL.  
The results support H1, H2b, H3c, H4b, and H4c, and reject H2a, H3a, H3b and H4a, since no 
significant associations are revealed between ARL and each of profitability, board size, and AC 
size. Besides, opposite to the predictions, the outcomes reveal that board independence affects 
audit delay positively. 
 
 
H1 predicts a negative association between bank size and audit delay. The results accept 
this hypothesis and provide evidence that bank size (coefficient = -5.274, p =0.077) is significant 
predictor for ARL at 10 percent level. The studies of each of Ettredge et al. (2006), Afify (2009), 
Abbott et al. (2012), Khoufi and Khoufi (2018), and Durand (2019) confirm this result and found 
that the two variables are negatively and significantly related to each other.  
H2 (a) posits a negative relationship between profitability and ARL. The findings of this 
study reject this hypothesis and reveal an insignificant association between profitability 
(coefficient = -2.812, p = 0.716) and audit delay. This finding suggests that whether the Lebanese 
bank achieves high or low ROA that would not affect the date of issuing the audit report. Thus, 
the banks that achieve good (bad) performance are not interested to push the external auditors to 
faster (slower) the preparation of the audit report to early (postpone) transmit the good (bad) 
news to the stakeholders. This result is in line with Pizzini et al. (2015) and Oussii and Taktak 
(2018a) who reported insignificant association between the two variables. 
H2 (b) expects a positive association between leverage and ARL. Based on the findings 
shown in Table 6, the study accepts this hypothesis and provides evidence that leverage 
(coefficient =322.902, p =0.002) is significant predictor for ARL at 1 percent level; which means 
that banks with higher total debts experience longer ARL. This result is line with Ettredge et al. 
(2006), Abbott et al. (2012), Pizzini et al. (2015), Samaha and Khlif (2017), and Durand (2019).  
H3 (a) posits that board size is significantly related to audit delay. The findings of this 
study reject this hypothesis and show that board size (coefficient = -0.076, p =0.972) does not 
have significant impact on the audit report signature date. Thus, whether the board includes a big 
or small number of directors that would not affect the time disclosure of audit. This finding is 
consistent with Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010), Nelson and Shukeri (2011), Samaha and Khlif 
(2017), and Habib et al. (2019) who found a non-significant relationship between the two 
variables. 




Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t- test Sig.    
(P- Value) 
VIF 
β Std. Error β 
 
(Constant) -1.773 96.241  -0.018 .985  
SIZE -5.274 2.958 -.180 -1.783 .077* 2.080 
PROF -2.812 7.705 -.029 -0.365 .716 1.314 
LEV 322.902 99.411 .270 3.248 .002*** 1.410 
BSIZE -0.076 2.118 -.003 -0.036 .972 1.912 
BIND 56.518 17.794 .237 3.176 .002*** 1.138 
BMEET -2.227 1.251 -.131 -1.780 .078* 1.107 
ASIZE -6.243 4.521 -.118 -1.381 .170 1.497 
AIND -63.529 25.266 -.212 -2.514 .013** 1.448 
AMEET -11.551 3.627 -.275 -3.184 .002*** 1.520 
OWNC 0.265 .149 .145 1.783 .077* 1.344 
          R2 = 0.416       Adjusted R2 = 0.367       F- value= 8.49 (Sig. = .000)        DW = 2.024 
 Note: *significant at 10 % level; **significant at 5 % level; ***significant at 1 % level 
 
H3 (b) predicts a negative association between the independence of the board and audit 
lag. Opposite to the expectations, this study shows a positive significant association between 
board independence (coefficient =56.518, p =0.002) and ARL. In this concern, Nelson and 
Shukeri (2011), Chan et al. (2016), and Samaha and Khlif (2017) found that the two variables 
are not significantly associated. However, Afify (2009), Habib et al. (2019) and Durand (2019) 
showed negative and significant relationship between the two variables. Although this study 
contradicts the outcomes of these studies, it is in line with Wu et al. (2008) and Mohamad-Nor 
et al. (2010) who found positive and significant association between board independence and 
reporting lag. The researchers agree with the justification reported by Wu et al. (2008) for this 
result, the authors argued that boards with more non- executive members have more effective 
monitoring role and they usually devote additional time to check and verify the firm’s accounting 
and auditing issues; which would increase the ARL. 
H3 (c) expects a negative relationship between board diligence and ARL. The results 
accept this hypothesis and provide evidence that the frequency of board meetings (coefficient = 
-2.227, p =0.078) has negative and significant influence on ARL at 10 percent level. This finding 
is in line with Hashim and Rahman (2010) and Chan et al. (2016). The board would be able 
through the frequent meetings conducted during the year to perform close assessment of the 
financial reporting process and assure the early preparation of the audit report and the timely 
publishing of the audited financial statements.  
H4 (a) expects a negative association between AC size and ARL. The results do not 
provide evidence for significant association between the two variables; therefore, the hypothesis 
is rejected. This outcome is consistent with Oussii and Taktak (2018b) who revealed that ARL 
is not significantly associated with AC size. This finding can be justified by the close size of the 
sample banks’ ACs during the period (2012-2017). The ACs’ size of the 130 bank-year 
observations, with different ARLs, range within limited interval from 3 to 5 members as 
presented in Table 4.  
H4 (b) posits that the independence of the AC is negatively related to audit lag. The 
findings support this hypothesis and show that increasing the AC independence (coefficient = -
63.529, p =0.013) can significantly decrease ARL. Durand (2019) confirms this result and found 
that the two variables are negatively and significantly related to each other. This outcome 
provides evidence that the existence of non-executive and/or independent members in the AC 
enhances the internal controls over financial reporting, which would encourage the external 
auditors to increase their reliance on these controls and reduce the time-consuming audit tests; 
thus the ARL would decrease.  
H4 (c) suggests a negative association between AC diligence and audit lag. The results 
accept this hypothesis and reveal that as the number of AC meetings increases during the year 
the ARL significantly decreases. This outcome is in line with Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010) and 
Samaha and Khlif (2017) who found that the recurrence of AC meetings is negatively and 
significantly related to ARL. Through the repeated meetings, the AC would be informed about 
the various financial and auditing aspects, and might be able to direct the external auditors to 
issue timelier audit reports.  
Regarding the control variable, the findings provide evidence that there is positive and 
significant association between ownership concentration (coefficient = 0.265, p = 0.077) and 
ARL at 10 percent level. This result means that the Lebanese commercial banks with few major 
investors who own high percentages of stocks have longer audit delay. Although this outcome 
contradicts some studies (for example, Leventis et al., 2005; Hassan, 2016; Oussii & Taktak, 
2018b; Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018) which found that ownership concentration is insignificantly 
associated with ARL; nevertheless, all these studies posited a positive relationship between the 
two variables. 
 
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
ARL is measured in literature either as the number of days between the end of the firm’s 
fiscal year and the date of signing the audit report or as the natural logarithm of this amount 
(Samaha & Khlif, 2017; Durand, 2019). Following Samaha and Khlif (2017), the researchers 
performed a sensitivity test through measuring the ARL by its natural logarithm value instead of 
its original value. The F- value 10.691 (P = 0.000) of the sensitivity model, presented in Table 
 
7, supports the significance of the regression model. Moreover, the results of the robustness test 
reveal no serious differences between the outcomes of the study’s primary model and the 
sensitivity model. Consistent with the primary model, the results of the sensitivity test show that 
ARL is significantly and negatively related to each of bank size, frequency of board meetings, 
AC independence, and frequency of AC meetings; besides, the outcomes reveal that leverage 
and board independence are significantly and positively associated with ARL, at level 1 percent. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis reflects no significant association between ARL and each 
of profitability, AC size, board size, and ownership concentration.  
Thus, the results of the sensitivity test are consistent with the outcomes of the primary model 
concerning the significance and direction of the associations between each of the explanatory 
variables and ARL, except for the control variable (ownership concentration) that reveals to be 
significantly associated with audit lag in the primary model but insignificant in the sensitivity 
model. 
 
Table 7: Robustness Test  
  Primary  Model (ARL) 






(β) t- test 
Sig. 
( P-value)   
Coefficients 
(β) 
t- test Sig.  
( P-value)   
(Constant) 




            
SIZE   H1  (-) -5.274 -1.783    0.077* -0.043 -1.972  0.051* 
PROF      H2a (-) -2.812 -0.365    0.716 -0.054 -0.947  0.346 
LEV 
  H2b (+) 
322.902 3.248 
   
0.002*** 2.919 3.944  0.000*** 
BSIZE  H3a (?) -0.076 -0.036    0.972 -0.006 -0.359  0.721 
BIND 
H3b (-) 
56.518  3.176 
   
0.002*** 0.444 3.352  0.001*** 
BMEET H3c (-) -2.227 -1.780    0.078* -0.021 -2.214  0.029** 
ASIZE H4a (-) -6.243 -1.381    0.17 -0.033 -0.972  0.333 




   




            





Adjusted R2  0.367 0.429 
F (P-value)    8.49 (0.000***)  10.691 (0.000***) 









The timeliness of financial disclosure depends definitely on the timeliness of audit reports. The 
goal of this study is to investigate the company specific determinants and corporate governance 
determinants of ARL in the Lebanese context, specifically in the banking sector. Using the data of 24 
Lebanese commercial banks for six-year period, from 2012 to 2017, nine hypotheses were tested by 
conducting a multiple regression analysis. Regarding the company specific determinants, the study 
provides evidence that profitability has no significant effect on audit delay; however, bank size and 
leverage appear as significant determinants of ARL. The results show that large banks are more able 
to accelerate the publishing of the external audit reports; while, banks with high debts are less likely 
 
to decrease the external audit lag. These outcomes confirm that big banks are more capable to possess 
stronger internal control systems that can reduce the likelihood to have errors in the financial 
statements and enable the external auditors to depend more on those controls and faster the release of 
the audit reports. In addition, the high debts would increase the doubts of the external auditor on the 
quality of the financial reports because he would consider the probable existence of manipulations in 
the financial reports for the sake of releasing more optimistic information to the shareholders. In this 
case, the external auditor would increase the audit tests, which would delay the publishing of the audit 
report.   
Regarding the corporate governance determinants, the outcomes show that board diligence, AC 
independence, and AC diligence decrease ARL. Through the frequent board meetings, the directors 
would follow up and make close assessment to the firm’s financial and auditing situation and would 
assure timely disclosure of the annual report, including the external auditor opinion. In addition, 
through the frequent AC meetings, the members of the committee would be informed about the 
various accounting and auditing aspects and they can push the external auditors to faster the issuing 
of the audit report. Concerning AC independence, the presence of independent and non-executive AC 
members would improve the internal controls over financial reporting, which would reduce the 
substantive tests accomplished by the external auditors and faster the preparation of the audit report. 
With respect to board independence, the results reveal that the presence of non-executive members 
in the board increases ARL. For the sake of maintaining their reputation, the non-executive board 
members devote more time for checking the various financial and auditing matters, which increases 
the audit delay. Furthermore, the results show that each of AC size and board size have insignificant 
effect on ARL. Hence, increasing the number of members in the board or in its subcommittee do not 
have significant influence on the date of signing the external audit report.  
Regarding the control variable, the outcomes show that high ownership concentration increases 
significantly the ARL. This result confirms that the dominance of few investors who own big 
percentages of stocks increases the delay of issuing the external audit reports of the banks. In 
conclusion, the regression results reveal that banks with longer ARL are smaller, have higher 
leverage, elect more non-executive board directors, their boards and ACs conduct less meetings, their 
ACs are less independent from management, and have higher ownership concentration. 
The results of this study can be beneficial for the boards, managements, and the external 
auditors of the banking sector. Shedding the light on the key determinants of ARL may give insights 
for those parties to take decisions or follow procedures that faster the preparation of the audit reports, 
which would accelerate the publishing of the audited financial reports. For example, the outcomes of 
this study may encourage the Lebanese commercial banks’ boards and their ACs to conduct more 
frequent meetings during the year and increase the number of independent and non-executive 
members in the ACs. In addition, the results may stimulate the regulators and policy makers in 
different countries to issue laws to enhance the timeliness of audit disclosure in the banking sector. 
For example, the Lebanese central bank may issue new law or circular to shorten the deadline for 
submitting the banks’ external audit reports to be before September 30 of each year. Moreover, due 
to the significance impact of ownership concentration on ARL, as revealed in this study, issuing a 
new law that sets the maximum percentage of stocks that can be owned by each stockholder may 
decrease the ARL of the Lebanese banks. 
This research adds and contributes to the finite literature that investigates the influence of firm 
characteristics and corporate governance factors on the ARL in the Middle East countries by focusing 
on the Lebanese context, specifically on the Lebanese banking sector. Moreover, through covering 
six-year period (2012-2017), this research considers the limitations of other previous studies (for 
example, Afify, 2009; Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010; Nelson & Shukeri, 2011; Hassan, 2016) who 
focused only on one year in their examinations of the determinants of ARL. Considering a long-term 
interval that covers six-year period to investigate the determinants of ARL, rather than focusing on 
one single year, provides more valid results and reflects the trend of ARL over the time.  
However, the current study has two limitations that shed the light on future research. First, this 
study considers the impact of company characteristics and corporate governance factors on ARL and 
excludes the influence of audit related attributes. The literature (for example, Hajiha & Rafiee, 2011; 
Dao & Pham, 2014; Pizzini et al., 2015; Samaha & Khlif, 2017; Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018; Oussii & 
Taktak, 2018a; Durand, 2019) revealed that certain audit factors (such as the type of audit report, 
auditor change, and the type of auditors) have significant influence on ARL. After going through the 
 
130 bank-year observations of the 24 sample banks during the six-year period (2012-2017), the 
researchers found that most of the banks’ audit reports are unqualified, few banks changed their 
external auditors, and each bank appointed two external audit firms one of them is a big N audit firm. 
The Basic Circular No 122 published by the Lebanese central bank in 2009 requires from the banks 
working in Lebanon to appoint the external auditors for a renewable three-year period (BDL, 2009), 
which would decrease the likelihood to have changes in the external auditors of these banks. In 
addition, the periodic visit of the qualified external auditors of the big N audit firms to the Lebanese 
commercial banks during the audit period and the continuous follow up with management to correct 
the misstatements in the financial reports and the deficiencies in the internal controls decrease the 
probability of having qualified audit opinions. This may justify the rarely existence of qualified audit 
reports. Due to these reasons, the researchers did not consider the audit factors because they assumed 
that those factors would not have significant role in interpreting the ARL of the Lebanese banks. The 
second limitation of this study is that it focuses only on the banking sector and excludes the other 
Lebanese sectors (e.g. insurance, manufacturing, other service sectors, etc…). The exclusion of the 
other sectors is due to the difficulty of getting the annual reports of their firms, especially that most 
of these companies do not publish their annual reports. In addition, these sectors have different 
regulations and policies from the banking sector. Indeed, those limitations can be considered as bases 
for future research. 
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